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Abstract
RFID-tags are a new generation of bar-codes with added
functionality. An emerging application is the use of RFID-
tags for anti-counterfeiting by embedding them into a prod-
uct. Public-key cryptography (PKC) offers an attractive so-
lution to the counterfeiting problem but whether a public-
key cryptosystem can be implemented on an RFID tag or not
remains unclear. In this paper, we investigate which PKC-
based identification protocols are useful for these anti-
counterfeiting applications. We also discuss the feasibil-
ity of identification protocols based on Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography (ECC) and show that it is feasible on RFID tags.
Finally, we compare different implementation options and
explore the cost that side-channel attack countermeasures
would have on such implementations.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the growth of counterfeit goods has ex-
perienced a rather steep increase. This increase translates
into a large source of losses for manufacturers. For exam-
ple, it has been estimated that the world market for coun-
terfeit goods was worth between 350 and 385 billion USD
in 2001 and it was expected to surpass the 500 billion USD
per year mark by 2004 [13]. Notice that the above numbers
only point to the economical consequences of counterfeit
products. However, in the particular case of the pharmaceu-
tical industry, counterfeit products have a direct (negative)
impact on the health and life of thousands of people world-
wide. It is clear that new technologies need to be put in
place to thwart the counterfeiting threat. RFID has been
identified as one of these technologies as shown for exam-
∗A preliminary version of this paper appears in the Workshop for RFID
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ple by legislation introduced in the US mandating use of
RFID technology as anti-counterfeiting technology for at-
risk pharmaceuticals for all medicines in the supply chain
by the end of 2010 [17]. However, the use of RFID as an
anti-counterfeiting technology is at present rather primitive.
The whole security relies on the premise that an RFID
tag is harder to copy than a bar code. However, it has al-
ready been demonstrated several times that simple RFID
tags can be cloned. For example, Bono et al. [6] have
shown how an RFID transponder device manufactured by
Texas Instruments and used in many car keys can be suc-
cessfully cloned with off-the-shelf equipment and minimal
RF expertise (see also [30] for another example). Thus,
sound technological solutions for the counterfeiting prob-
lem need to be developed. By sound, we mean solutions
based on cryptography, fundamental physical properties of
materials that make them unclonable or a combination of
both. Notice that the anti-counterfeiting problem can also
be rephrased as an authentication problem. In other words,
how can a reader tell that a certain RFID tag is really the
one that it intended to talk to? In this setting, RFID-tags
contain some secret reference information that is used to
check their authenticity. In order to avoid counterfeiting,
RFID-tags have to be unclonable. First, this implies that
it should be hard to make a physical clone. Secondly, this
also means that retrieving the secret reference information
by attacking the protocols that are carried out between the
reader and a tag (proving its authenticity) should be infeasi-
ble. Protection against physical unclonability is provided by
using physical countermeasures such as Physical Unclon-
able Functions [28] and protection against active or pas-
sive attacks on the protocols is provided by cryptographic
techniques such as digital signatures and secure identifica-
tion protocols. In short, RFID-based identification is an ex-
ample of an emerging technology which requires authen-
tication as a cryptographic service. This property can be
achieved by symmetric as well as asymmetric primitives.
Previous work considered only symmetric-key algorithms
e.g. AES [8]. It is still not clear whether Public-Key (PK)
algorithms can be implemented in constrained devices, such
as RFID tags, and still comply with the area, performance,
and power requirements typical of these applications. Re-
cently, a few papers [28, 31] discussed feasibility of ECC
based PKC on RFID-tags. Here, we extend that line of
work and discuss implementations aspects of even stronger
PK-based protocols in more detail. In particular, the pro-
tocols investigated in [28] were only secure against passive
attacks. Thus, in this paper, we investigate the efficiency of
protocols (Okamoto-identification protocol) that are also se-
cure against active and concurrent attacks. It is shown that
only a small price for much additional security has to be
paid. In addition, we present ECC-based implementation
of the above mentioned protocols and compared different
implementations methods available.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides an overview of related work. In Sect. 3 we
state our assumptions and review the protocol of [28] de-
scribing only the PUF-based protocol for the off-line au-
thentication case. The Okamoto identification protocol and
its hardware implementation for off-line verification are de-
scribed in Sect. 4. Finally, our results are presented in
Sect. 5.
2 Related Work
Protocols for cheap authentication have been presented
[16, 15]. However, they focus on the on-line situation in
which the reader shares a secret with the tag being authenti-
cated. In addition, they do not take physical cloning into ac-
count. In [28], RFID-tags that withstand general cloning at-
tacks (including physical ones) are introduced. Based on an
Integrated PUF (I-PUF) [9, 29] a PUF-Certificate-Identity
Based identification scheme was introduced. This scheme
allows for off-line authentication. In [28] the implemen-
tation of the Schnorr Identification scheme was investigated
for this purpose. This protocol is only secure against passive
attacks but it is very efficient. There have not been many at-
tempts at hardware implementations of PKC on RFID tags
or other low-power application platforms e.g. sensor nodes.
Gaubatz et al. [11] showed that RSA is not a feasible solu-
tion while NtruEncrypt can be implemented in about 3000
gates. More recent work of Wolkerstorfer [31] is the first
to claim possible to have low-power and compact imple-
mentation of ECC that meets the constraints imposed by the
EPC standard. However, our solution is smaller as the off-
line authentication in our case does not require full ECDSA
signature generation to be executed on the RFID tag. This
allowed for further area optimizations.
3 Off-line Authentication
We distinguish between on-line and off-line authentica-
tion. Off-line authentication is the most attractive one from
a practical point of view but also the most challenging one,
as costs grow much more in this case. The particular case
of on-line authentication was considered in [28] and it does
not make use of PK cryptography, thus we do not discuss it
any further.
3.1 Assumptions
We consider RFID-tags embedded in a product or its
package for detection and prevention of product counterfeit-
ing. The tag is manufactured and embedded into the prod-
uct by a legitimate authority which is assumed to be trusted.
We consider an active attacker that knows the position of the
tag in the product or its package, so she can remove the tag
from the package to investigate it. We also assume that the
attacker can (passively) eavesdrop on the channel between a
reader and the tag, or can install a fake reader that commu-
nicates with the tag (active attack). Finally, we assume that
the attacker can physically attack the tag; i.e. she can try to
read out its memory. The goal of the attacker is to produce
a fake RFID-tag containing reference information such that
it can only be distinguished from a real tag with small prob-
ability . Clearly, by embedding such a fake tag into a fake
product, the fake product is identified as an authentic one.
3.2 Authentication Protocol
In [28] a PUF-Certificate-Identity based Identification
scheme was proposed. For the sake of completeness we de-
scribe it briefly here but refer to [28] for the details. Given
the following algorithms and definitions:
• a tag with identity I and a PUF,
• a standard identification scheme SI = (Kg, P, V ),
where Kg denotes the key generation algorithm, and
P, V denote the interactive protocols run by the prover
and verifier respectively, and
• a secure signature scheme SS = (SKg,Sign, Vf ), with
SKg denoting the key generation algorithm, Sign de-
noting the signing algorithm and Vf the verification
algorithm run by a verifier
a PUF-Certificate-Identity based Identification scheme
(MKg,UKg, Pˆ , Vˆ ) can be constructed as follows.
During enrollment the issuer uses SKg as the master-key
generation algorithm MKg for the secure signature scheme.
The result is the issuer’s master-key pair (mpk,msk). The
algorithm UKg creates for each tag a public-secret key pair
(pk, sk) using the algorithm Kg for the SI-scheme. The
issuer runs a protocol with the tag to determine the PUF’s
challenge c and helper data w such that the PUF response
x(c) maps onto the secret key sk. The helper data w are
written into the ROM (EEPROM) memory of the tag. Fi-
nally, the issuer, using his master secret-key msk to sign,
creates the following certificate that is also stored in the
ROM of the tag Cert ← (pk,Sign(msk, pk||ID)).
During authentication the algorithms Pˆ and Vˆ are run
as follows. The tag (in the role of the prover) sends the cer-
tificate Cert to the reader. If Cert is valid, the tag and the
reader run the SI-protocol. If the tag passes this protocol
too, the reader decides that the tag is authentic and other-
wise not. Note that in order to run this last step, the tag has
to challenge its PUF and use the helper data to obtain the
secret key sk from the measured response y(c).
The security of the scheme depends on three factors: (i)
the security of the PUF as a secure storage of the secret key,
(ii) the security of the identification scheme used, and (iii)
the security of the signature scheme used. It was shown in
[28] that if the PUF is unclonable and a good Fuzzy Extrac-
tor is used for key extraction, the PUF provides a secure way
of storing secret keys. The security of the scheme against
impersonation attacks depends on the security of the identi-
fication scheme used against those attacks. Therefore, it is
of crucial importance to understand which trade-off is being
made between efficiency and security.
4 Okamoto’s ID Protocol Based on ECDLP
In [28], Schnorr’s identification protocol [26] is used as
the SI in the Cert-IBI. Furthermore, it is shown that the
elliptic curve version of Schnorr’s identification protocol
can be efficiently implemented. Schnorr’s protocol is, how-
ever, only resistant against passive attacks under the discrete
logarithm assumption. Another protocol that is also resis-
tant against active and concurrent attack under the discrete
logarithm assumption is Okamoto’s identification protocol
[25]. We investigate therefore the efficiency of the imple-
mentation of this protocol here in detail. Notice that we
are considering Okamoto’s identification protocol as it pro-
vides security against active adversaries and it is based on
the hardness of the DL problem. Other protocols found in
the literature include Beth’s identification protocol [5] and
the XDL-IBI scheme in [3]. Beth’s protocol only requires
one point multiplication but it remains an open problem to
prove its security against active adversaries. The XDL-IBI
scheme also requires only one point multiplication but is
only secure against passive adversaries and concurrent at-
tacks (under a modified assumption). Thus, it seems that
by analyzing both Schnorr’s and Okamoto’s we cover the
efficiency of all available ID protocols based on the hard-
ness of the DL problem. Protocols based on the hardness
1. Common Input: The set of system parameters in this case consists of: (q, FR, a, b, P1 , P2 , n, h). Here, q
specifies the finite field, FR is a field representation, a, b, define an elliptic curve, Pi is a point on the curve
of order n and h is the cofactor. In the case of tag authentication, these parameters are assumed to be fixed.
2. Prover-Tag Input: The prover’s secret (s1, s2) such thatZ = −s1P1 − s2P2 .
3. Protocol: The protocol involves the exchange of the following messages:
ProverP VerifierV
r1, r2 ∈R Zn
X ← r1P1 + r2P2 X 
eﬀ e ∈R Z2t
yi = ri + esi mod n,
i = 1, 2 y1, y2 
If y1P1 + y2P2 + eZ = X
then accept else reject
Figure 1. Okamoto’s identification protocol.
of integer factorization also exist (see [3, 23] for a thorough
classification of ID-based protocols) but their performance
and scalability properties are worse, in general, than those
based on ECDLP as the comparisons in [10] show.
4.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
The main operation in any ECC-based primitive is the
scalar multiplication. The point scalar multiplication is
achieved by repeated point addition and doubling. We can
use the basic double-and-add algorithm in both cases. In
the case of Schnorr’s identification protocol, we can also
use the Montgomery ladder method [22] and benefit from
the Lopez-Dahab projective coordinates [19].
4.1.1 Point Addition and Doubling
The point addition/doubling depend on the type of projec-
tive coordinate used. Table 1 summarizes the number of op-
erations required for known projective coordinates in terms
of multiplications, squarings, and additions. The number of
operations is assuming general values for Z. However, this
value varies based on the values of the curve coefficients
a, b are considered1.
Table 1. Operation Counts for EC point addi-
tion and doubling
Coordinate System Addition Doubling
Mult. Sqr. Add. Mult. Sqr. Add.
Jacobian projective (X/Z2, Y/Z3) [7] a = 0 15 5 7 5 5 4
Jacobian projective (X/Z2, Y/Z3) [7] a = 0 14 4 7 5 5 4
Lopez-Dahab (X/Z, Y/Z) [19] b = 1 4 1 2 2 4 1
Lopez-Dahab (X/Z, Y/Z) [19] b = 1 4 1 2 1 4 1
Modified Lopez-Dahab (X/Z, Y/Z) [28] b = 1 6 1 2 3 5 1
4.1.2 Field Operations
Fields of characteristic two in polynomial basis were chosen
as field arithmetic can be implemented efficiently and rela-
1The EC is defined as y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b, with a, b ∈ F2n .
tively cheaply in hardware. Notice that our emphasis is on
minimizing area rather than performance. Addition of two
elements C = A+B ∈ F2n is performed via an n–bitwise
logical XOR operation. The simplest multiplier is based on
Horner’s scheme for multiplication. In particular, to com-
pute the product C = A · B ∈ F2n ∼= F2[x]/f(x), and
A =
∑n−1
i=0 aix
i
, B =
∑n−1
j=0 bjx
j
, f = xn +
∑s
i=0 fix
i
,
s < n, we process one bit of B at the time as follows
C =
n−1∑
j=0
n−1∑
i=0
aibjx
i+j mod f = A
n−1∑
j=0
bjx
j mod f
The multiplication process then requires n iterations. Digit
serial multiplication [27] is a generalization of this in which
several coefficients of B are processed in parallel. Thus, we
trade off area for performance. Algorithm 1 describes how
to perform Most Significant Digit multiplication according
to [12] which reduces the area of the multiplier with respect
to [27] and [2] by not requiring either an additional reduc-
tion circuit as in [27] or additional n + 2D − 1 MUXes
as in [2]. The cost is a longer critical path, which at the
frequencies of operation that we are considering does not
affect the overall performance. Squaring c = a2 ∈ F2n
Algorithm 1 Most Significant Digit Multiplication in F2n
Require: A =
∑n−1
i=0 aix
i
, where ai ∈ F2, B =∑−1
j=0 b̂jx
jD where b̂j =
∑D−1
l=0 bDj+lx
l
, bi ∈ F2, and
d =  nD .
Ensure: C = A ·B mod f(x)
1: C ← 0
2: for i = 0 to d− 1 do
3: C ←
(
b̂d−1−iA+ CxD
)
mod f
4: end for
5: Return C
is a special case of multiplication. It is well known that
a2 =
∑n−1
i=0 aix
2i which can then be reduced modulo f to
a field element in F2n .
4.2 ECC processor
Our Elliptic Curve Processor (ECP) for RFID has the fol-
lowing operational blocks: a Control Unit(CU), an Arith-
metic Unit (ALU), and Memory (RAM and ROM). The
ECC parameters and the constants are stored in ROM. On
the other hand, RAM contains all input/output and interme-
diate variables and it therefore communicates with both, the
ROM and the ALU. The CU controls scalar multiplication
and point operations. In addition, the controller commands
the ALU which performs field multiplication, addition and
squaring. The bits of the scalar multiplier k =
∑n−1
i=0 ki2
i
,
ki = {0, 1}, n = log2 k, are evaluated from MSB to LSB.
The CU consists of a number of simple state machines and
a counter and its area cost is small.
5 Results and Discussion
In this section, we provide results for the latency and
the area complexities of both Schnorr’s and Okamoto’s pro-
tocols. As we are interested in implementations of iden-
tification protocols (e.g. Schnorr, Okamoto) the opera-
tion required is one point multiplication in the case of
Schnorr’s protocol or multiple-point multiplication in the
case of Okamoto’s scheme.
5.1 Implementation of Okamoto’s Scheme
In [28], the feasibility of the ECC version of Schnorr’s
identification protocol in an RFID system was investigated
and area and latency estimates were provided. Here, we
provide detailed numbers and we also investigate the fea-
sibility of the Okamoto’s scheme as it provides security
against active adversaries which Schnorr’s scheme does not.
Table 2 summarizes the number of operations that the dif-
Table 2. Cycle count for EC operations over
F2p . L: Load, C: Computation, S: Store, d =
 pD , n = log2 k
Operation L C S Total Cycles
F2p addition 2 1 1 4
F2p squaring 1 1 1 3
F2p multiplication 2 d 1 d + 3
EC operations assuming a squarer
Projective coordinate type Addition Doubling Total k · P
Jacobian projective (X/Z2, Y/Z3) [7] a = 0 15d + 88 5d + 46 12.5nd + 90n
Jacobian projective (X/Z2, Y/Z3) [7] a = 0 14d + 82 5d + 46 12nd + 87n
Lopez-Dahab (X/Z, Y/Z) [19] b = 1 4d + 23 2d + 22 6nd + 45n
Lopez-Dahab (X/Z, Y/Z) [19] b = 1 4d + 23 d + 19 5nd + 42.5n
Modified Lopez-Dahab (X/Z, Y/Z) [28] b = 1 6d + 29 3d + 28 9nd + 57n
EC operations assuming no squarer
Modified Lopez-Dahab (X/Z, Y/Z) [28] b = 1 7d + 29 8d + 28 15nd + 57n
ferent addition formulae imply. Here we assume that for
the Jacobian coordinates on average we perform n dou-
blings and n/2 addition operations and that for the Lopez-
Dahab coordinates we use the Montgomery ladder with n
iterations2. Notice that the modified formulae presented in
[28] provide simple side-channel attack resistance if im-
plemented without the use of a dedicated squarer. In this
case, the formula of [28] are almost 3 times as slow as the
standard formulae from [19] which does not provide side-
channel resistance.
In Okamoto’s scheme, the required computation on the
tag is of the form kP + lQ. For the purpose of speeding-up
this computation one uses Shamir’s trick. The algorithm
performs this so-called simultaneous point multiplication
2The actual number of doublings is n − 1 for the binary method, but
we chose n in the interest of space.
computing at each of  nw  steps w doublings and 1 addition
from a list of 2w pre-calculated values of the form iP + jQ.
As the width of the window w is variable, this allows to
trade-off area for speed. We chose the smallest window i.e.
w = 1. In this way, the memory requirements are mini-
mized as only 3 points have to be stored: P,Q, P +Q. The
expected running time of the algorithm for w = 1 is 34n
point additions and (n− 1) point doublings.
We have implemented the Schnorr scheme in VHDL and
obtained area and timing values for a 0.25µm CMOS li-
brary. We have used these values to estimate the perfor-
mance of Okamoto’s identification protocol using Shamir’s
Trick and Jacobian coordinates. Table 3 summarizes the re-
sults. We notice that the amount of logic required to support
Okamoto’s protocol is not significantly larger than that cor-
responding to the implementation of Schnorr’s. However,
the required RAM to implement Okamoto’s identification
protocol is more than twice the required RAM required for
Schnorr’s. In practice this means an increase in area any-
where from 20% to 50% depending on the chosen RAM
implementation (i.e. whether a RAM cell is implemented as
a register requiring at least 6 equivalent gates worth of area
or as dedicated embedded RAM requiring somewhere be-
tween 1.5 and 2 equivalent gates [14]). In terms of latency,
Okamoto’s identification protocol is almost twice as slow as
Schnorr’s over elliptic curves due to the fact that the coordi-
nate representation introduced in [19] is only applicable to
the Montgomery Ladder method of exponentiation. In addi-
tion, simultaneous double exponentiation is naturally about
25% slower than the regular binary method for exponentia-
tion. With respect to the most compact solution, as required
due to low gate-count and low-power requirements, imple-
menting curve-based protocols with shorter bit-lengths ap-
pears to be an attractive option. For example, in the case of
ECC one could use 130-bit long parameters. This solution
would still maintain a suitable level of security [18], espe-
cially for low-cost RFIDs, and the gate complexity would
scale-down accordingly resulting in more attractive solu-
tions from the area and performance points of view. We
conclude by noticing that the performance of the simulta-
neous point multiplication (as well as the binary method)
can be easily improved by using Non-Adjacent Form rep-
resentation for the multiplier. Such methods in the binary
case would for example reduce the number of multiplica-
tions from a half on average to a third, providing significant
performance improvements (see for example [21]).
5.2 A Word Regarding Power
At the present moment, we do not have an actual chip
and we lack explicit power measurements for our simula-
tions. Nevertheless, we believe that attaining the power
values required for RFID applications using our design is
Table 3. Implementation results @ 175 kHz
and assuming a dedicated squarer circuit.
Implementation ALU RAM Mont. RAM Perf. Mont. Perf. Area wo RAM
Digit Field [gates] Ladder Okamoto Ladder Okamoto [gates]
Size Size [bits] [bits] [s] [s]
D=1 F2131 6306 917 2096 0.91 1.59 8582
F2139 6690 973 2224 1.02 1.79 9044
F2163 7846 1141 2608 1.38 2.44 10122
D=2 F2131 6962 917 2096 0.48 0.83 8603
F2139 7379 973 2224 0.53 0.93 9734
F2163 8663 1141 2608 0.71 1.27 10933
possible. In fact, our processor architecture is very sim-
ilar to the architecture presented in [31]. One particular
characteristic of both designs is the usage of an Arithmetic
Logic Unit (ALU) with a full-precision data path. The dif-
ferences are on the details of our implementation: field size,
choice of finite field arithmetic methodology (Montgomery
vs. dedicated trinomial or pentanomial circuits), support
for multiple fields versus support for a single field, hash-
ing versus no hashing required in our implementation, etc.
In general, our design is aimed at making our implemen-
tation as specific as possible to our particular application.
This methodology leads to significant complexity reduction
in the area requirements and thus also to power savings.
Thus, since [31] was able to attain the power requirements
of an RFID system, we are confident that our design, be-
ing smaller and simpler, will also attain the required power
figures at the same or lower operating frequencies.
5.3 Generation of Randomness
Finally notice that a source of randomness is needed on
the tag. In our case, this can be done by applying a random
challenge to the PUF e.g. in a range out of its specification.
The random challenge can be generated by the reader. For a
construction of a random number generator based on a PUF,
we refer to [24].
5.4 On Performance and Other Imple-
mentations
Recently, McLoone and Robshaw [20] explore the hard-
ware cost of the GPS scheme modified for ultra-low cost de-
vices, such as RFID tags. The authors achieve costs equiv-
alent to those of symmetric-key encryption as described in
the work of Feldhofer et al. [8], in other words in the order
of 1700 equivalent gates for their largest implementation
and requiring not more than 900 cycles, which at 100 KHz
translates into 9 msec and under 3.4 µA of current. How-
ever, it is not possible to compare fairly the work of this
paper with that of [20]. First, the implementation of [20] is
based on the idea of coupons. In other words, the RFID tag
stores a number of challenge-response pairs that have been
precomputed and only performs the last part of the 3-pass
authentication protocol which in general is much cheaper
to implement and requires an addition and a single modu-
lar multiplication. This implies that the RFID tag can only
authenticate itself a limited number of times. On the other
hand, our solution can participate in an unlimited number of
authentications. Second, the hardware requirements of [20]
do not include the storage cost of the coupons in their esti-
mates, whereas our implementation does include this cost3.
Obviously, which solution is best will depend in the end on
the requirements of the application. If the application only
requires that the RFID tag be operational for just a few au-
thentications, then the solution described in [20] will be ad-
equate, otherwise our flexible elliptic curve solution would
be the one of choice.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we discussed the feasibility of public key
based secure identification protocols for RFID-tags. As an
example we investigated the implementation of Okamoto’s
identification protocol in detail. It was shown that it is just
slightly more expensive than Schnorr’s identification proto-
col. Finally, we notice that the performance of Okamoto’s
protocol can be further improved using the techniques pre-
sented in [1] and recently improved in [4]. Such improve-
ments will be considered in future work.
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